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SUMMARY 
 
To know your law and not to understand it is like a legal barbarian lost in the 
battlefield of legal theory.  A proper and thorough understanding of the law of 
evidence and hearsay evidence in particular, is of paramount importance not only for 
lawyers but also for persons who regard themselves as labour law experts.  It takes a 
great deal of experience before a lawyer truly becomes confident with the law of 
evidence and its application.  The only way one becomes good at it is firstly to know 
the law.  (Where does it come from and why is it there?)  Then one must get to 
understand it by looking at examples and apply it in practice.  Only then will a person 
gain practical experience. 
 
The aim of this treatise is not to try and educate experienced lawyers.  This article is 
aimed at those that need some motivation to pursue their journey in the labour law 
process.  Remember we all assume that lawyers know and understand their subject 
until they proof the contrary.  In this work I shall try to highlight the importance of the 
law of evidence in labour law proceedings.  Firstly the meaning of the law of evidence 
and hearsay evidence is considered.  Further emphasis will be on the approach and 
application of the law of evidence, and in particular the hearsay rule, in labour law 
proceedings. 
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1. THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 
 
The law of evidence is part of adjective law as opposed to the substantive law.  In 
Tregea v Godart Stratford C J stated that “substantive law lays down what has to be 
proved in any given issue and by whom, and the rules of evidence relate to the 
manner of its proof”.1   In any given issue we have facta probanda (facts in dispute) 
and facta probantia (proving facts).  The last mentioned facts are demonstrated by 
the adjective law and in particular the law of evidence.  The law of evidence 
according to Stratford C J provides “the manner of its proof”.2   Hoffman and Zeffert 
criticised Stratford’s statement.3   According to them not all the rules relating to the 
manner of proving the facts in issue can be described as rules of evidence.   
Schmidt4 classifies the law of evidence as the whole of legal rules that are applicable 
to prove facts in a court of law.   The importance of a distinction between substantive 
law and adjective law is not only for theoretical purpose, but also for practical 
purpose.  Our common law stems from the Roman Dutch Law and English Law.5  
The Roman Dutch Law is the source of our substantive law.  The English Law is the 
source of our adjective law.  Therefore we have to look at the English common law 
for the rules of evidence.6  
 
2. COMMON LAW 
 
Statutory law now replaces the common law in relation to hearsay evidence, - see 
                                                                 
1 1939 AD 16  31. 
2 Tregea v Godart supra 31. 
3 Hoffman and Zeffert The South African Law of Evidence 4 ed 4-6. 
4 Schmidt Bewysreg 3 ed (1989) 6. 
5 The common law is our unwritten customary law, the law common to us which we inherited; as 
well as case law in this regard. 
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the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.7  The common law is however still part of our 
law of which cognizance must be taken.  The reason is that the common law rule can 
assist the arbitrator when using his discretion to allow hearsay or not.  We can 
therefore not ignore or forget our common law.  It gives us guidance as to what 
approach to follow.  In Mnyama v Gxalaba there was a dispute as to who would 
decide where to bury the deceased.8  The question arose as to whether the 
deceased statements as to where he wants to be buried, could be admitted as 
hearsay.  Conradie J had the following to say about the common:  “The Law of 
Evidence Amendment Act has made all of this obsolete but not irrelevant”.9   
Conradie J was of the view that the mere fact that the evidence was admissible 
under the common law rule is a strong factor in favour of its admissibility in terms of 
the new Act.  The evidence was eventually admitted in this case, but its probative 
value made it not worthwhile to take into account. 
 
The classical common law definition of hearsay was provided in Estate De Wet v De 
Wet “... evidence of statements made by persons not called as witnesses which are 
tendered for the purpose of proving the truth of what is contained in the statement”.10  
The focus here is on statements of non-witnesses for the sole purpose of proving the 
truth.  It will hereby be noted that a statement of a non-witness will only be hearsay if 
it is tendered to be the truth.  If the dispute is about whether or not certain rumours 
were spread in the workplace then evidence of the rumours to be true will be 
considered as hearsay, because the evidence is tendered to prove that the rumours 
are true. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
6 See Hoffman and Zeffert Law of Evidence 623. 
7 45 of 1988. 
8 1990 (1) SA 650 (C). 
9 Mnyama v Gxalaba supra 652J. 
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If the dispute is about whether or not such rumours exist then evidence tendered to 
proof that the rumours were spread, will not be classified as hearsay.  The purpose 
for which the evidence was tendered is not to prove that the rumours are true, but 
merely that they exist.11 
 
Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible not because of relevance, but because of 
its unreliability.  There are exceptions however.  The exceptions to the hearsay rule 
originated through case law in England.  The courts refrained from creating new 
exceptions.12  The existing common law exceptions are a numerus clausus.   In 
Vulcan Rubber Works (Pty) Ltd v SAR & H13 the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court confirmed that our courts have no discretion to expand the numerus clausus of 
exceptions.  The common law exceptions on the hearsay rule have their origin due to 
the fact that it was sometimes difficult to obtain direct evidence about a certain fact 
and because there is some “guarantee of truth” present in the hearsay. 
 
A few important exceptions are the following:  Res gestae is one exception and it 
means “what happened” or “what was done”.  This means that the term is used to 
indicate that the words a non-witness uttered should be allowed because the words 
is part of a transaction or occurrence.  Typical examples of this term are the instant 
response of an employee at a workplace accident or the complaint by a woman 
immediately after a rape.  The term however can incorporate several different 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
10 1924 CPD 341. 
11 For an example of a civil case where the dispute involved rumours that certain cigarettes 
causes cancer - see International Tobacco Co (SA) Ltd v United Tobacco Cos (South) Ltd 1953 
(3) SA 343 (A). 
12 Iudicis est ius dicere non dare (it is the province of a judge to expound or interpret the law not to 
make it). 
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grounds of admissibility and a loose usage of the term is open to criticism.  
 
It is not relevant to elaborate on this point any further for the purpose of this treatise.  
It also is more of academic nature.  “Instant response” can also be an exception 
apart from res gestae.14 
 
Secondly, statements made by a person who dies after the statement was made is 
an exception to the hearsay rule.  For example, statements made against once own 
interest  (pecuniary or property) contains some guarantee of truth.  A further example 
is statements made by someone during the dying-hour.  We expect some guarantee 
of truth from a person in a hour of death.15  There are also other examples in this 
regard which deals with public rights, contents of wills and descent which is not 
necessary to elaborate on. 
 
4. THE CURRENT POSITION 
 
Hearsay evidence is dealt with in section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.16  
This section provides as follows: 
 
(1) Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall not be 
admitted as evidence at criminal or civil proceedings, unless: 
 
(a) each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the 
admission thereof as evidence at such proceedings; 
 
(b) the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence 
depends, himself testifies at such proceedings; or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
13 1958 (3) SA 285 (A).  For a discussion on the common law exceptions - see Hoffman and 
Zeffert Law of Evidence 624 - 649. 
14 Titus v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980(1) SA 119 (A). 
15 Flange Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd v Elands Steel Mills (Pty) Ltd 1963(2) SA 303 (W). 
16 45 of 1988. 
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(c) the court, having regard to- 
 
(i) the nature of the proceedings; 
(ii) the nature of the evidence; 
(iii) the purpose for which the evidence is tendered; 
(iv) the probative value of the evidence; 
(v) the reason why the evidence is not given by the person upon whose 
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends; 
(vi) any prejudice to a party which the admission of such evidence might 
entail; and 
(vii) any other factor which should in the opinion of the court be taken into 
account, is of the opinion that such evidence  should be admitted in 
the interest of justice. 
 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) shall not render admissible any evidence that is 
inadmissible on any ground other than that such evidence is hearsay evidence. 
 
(3) Hearsay evidence may be provisionally admitted in terms of subsection (1)(b) if 
the court is informed that the person upon whose credibility the probative value of 
such evidence depends, will himself testify in such proceedings:  Provided that if 
such person does not later testify in such proceedings, the hearsay evidence 
shall be left out of account unless the hearsay evidence is admitted in terms of 
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) or admitted by the court in terms of paragraph (c) 
of that subsection. 
 
(4) For the purpose of this section- 
 
 “hearsay evidence” means evidence, whether oral or in writing, the probative 
value of which depends upon the credibility of any person other than the person 
giving such evidence; 
 
 “party” means the accused or party against whom hearsay evidence is to be 
adduced, including the prosecution”. 
 
5. THE NEW MEANING OF HEARSAY 
 
It is significant to note that the purpose of submitting hearsay is now irrelevant.  In 
common law, hearsay could only be allowed for the sole purpose of proving the truth.  
Now there is room to allow additional evidence. 
 
Of further significance is the fact that our courts now have discretion to allow hearsay 
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evidence under section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.17   In 
addition, parties can consent to the admission of hearsay evidence. 
 
Finally, hearsay evidence may provisionally be allowed, on condition that the person 
upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends, later came to 
testify at the proceedings.  Presiding officers sometimes provisionally allow hearsay  
evidence if they are uncertain about its admissibility.  Then only at the end of the 
case do they decide over the admissibility of the hearsay.  That, to me, is not 
advisable because section 3(3) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act18 sets the 
conditions under which hearsay could be provisionally allowed.  Further the evidence 
before the presiding officer might be tainted by inadmissible hearsay,  which should 
not have, be there in the first place. 
 
6. THE APPLICATION OF AND APPROACH TO THE HEARSAY RULE IN 
LABOUR LAW PROCEEDINGS 
 
In section 3(1) Law of Evidence Amendments Act19 reference is made to “criminal 
and civil proceedings”.  The question is whether arbitration proceedings can be 
considered as civil proceedings.  As far as the Labour Court is concerned there is no 
doubt that it is a court of law and equity equal to the status of the High Court as such 
in relation to matters under its jurisdiction - see Labour Relations Act.20  The Labour 
Court has inter alia review powers concerning arbitration awards.  The Labour 
Appeal Court is also a court of law and equity.  It is a final Court of appeal in respect 
                                                                 
17 45 of 1988. 
18 45 of 1988. 
19 45 of 1988. 
20  66 of 1995 s151 reads:  “(1) The Labour Court is hereby established as a court of law and 
equity.  (2) The Labour Court is a superior court that has authority, inherent powers and 
standing, in relation to matters under its jurisdiction, equal to that which a court of provincial 
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of Labour Court judgments and orders within its exclusive jurisdiction.  It is also 
clothed with the status equal to that of the Supreme Court of Appeal in relation to 
matters under its jurisdiction.21 
 
Criminal and civil proceedings deal with law of procedure (adjective law).  “Criminal 
proceedings” are described in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act.22  When 
section 196 of the said Act as well as section 5 of the Magistrates’ Court Act23 is read 
it becomes evident that “criminal proceedings” are court proceedings. The same 
applies to “civil proceedings”.  Although the Magistrates’ Court Act24 does not give a 
definition of “civil proceedings”, section 5(3) of the Act does refer to “civil proceedings 
in any court”. 
 
Arbitration proceedings are not proceedings in a court of law.25  Section 138(1) of the 
Labour Relations Act26 is indicative thereof.  
 
Section 138(1) reads:  “The commissioner may conduct the arbitration in a manner 
that the commissioner considers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly 
and quickly, but must deal with the substantial merits of the dispute with the minimum 
of legal formalities.” They are not “civil proceedings” in the strict sense of the word.  
Section 3(1)(c) of Act the Magistrates’ Court Act27 specifically uses the words “the 
court”. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
division of the Supreme Court has in relation to the matters under its jurisdiction.  (3) The 
Labour Court is a court of record”. 
21 See s 167 and 173 of the LRA. 
22 51 of 1977 
23 51 of 1977; 32 of 1944. 
24 32 of 1944. 
25 See Naraindath v CCMA & Others 2000 6 BLLR 716 (LC) 724H. 
26 66 of 1995. 
27 32 of 1944. 
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It is submitted that, despite arbitration proceedings being less formalistic to court 
proceedings, arbitrators still should not open the floodgates for the admission of 
hearsay.  The arbitration awards will form part of our case law.  Lawyers and Labour 
Court judges will consider the decisions.  It will make a mockery of our legal system if 
the case law is flooded with controversial decisions.  Justice must be done.  
Accordingly arbitrators should treat hearsay with circumspection and should take 
cognizance of the court decisions on Labour Law.  In Pick ‘n Pay Stores (Ltd) 
(Krugersdorp) and Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union of South Africa28 
the arbitrator appropriately decided that “(he) should certainly not rely on hearsay 
evidence in circumstances where a court of law would not rely upon it”. 
 
Further hearsay evidence was allowed in SA Commercial Catering and Allied 
Workers Union v OK Bazaars Ltd.29  Arbitrator Cameron decided that if evidence is 
not normally allowed in a court of law, there can be no doubt as to its admissibility.  
Cameron further allowed hearsay evidence based on other considerations, namely: 
 
(1)  that arbitration proceedings are less formal than judicial proceedings: therefore 
technical and formalistic objections should accordingly not be encouraged or 
emphasized; 
 
(2)  Hearsay evidence could be a means by which a proper exploration of potential 
sources of industrial conflict could be achieved; and 
 
                                                                 
28 (1988) Arb 2.21. 
29 (1992) 13 ILJ 436 (ARB). 
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(3)  Consideration of fear could require hearsay evidence to be admissible, for 
example in a case of intimidation. 
 
It is submitted that the standard of fairness considered should not be lowered in 
arbitration proceedings as opposed to court proceedings.  This could lead to double 
standards.  In S v Ramavhale30 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court31 
considered the admissibility and probative value of hearsay evidence in terms of 
section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.32  The court held that for 
many years our law knew a rigid exclusionary rule where specific expectations were 
allowed with no relaxation.  Hearsay evidence can now be accepted subject to the 
board almost limitless criteria set out in section 3(1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act.33   The court also pointed out that hearsay evidence has long be 
recognised to be unreliable and this seems to be the continuous trend.  The court 
further declared that a judge should hesitate before allowing hearsay evidence which 
plays a decisive or significant part in deciding, whether a accused is guilty or not.  
Only compelling justification should convince a judge to allow such hearsay 
evidence.  The same can be said about labour disputes as well.  In AIR Products 
CWIU34 arbitrator Damant correctly indicates the inherent danger that hearsay 
evidence contains.  He stated:  “I am of the view that where a company has a 
unilaterally imposed disciplinary procedure it must ensure that the procedure is fair 
even where the employee declines to participate”. 
                                                                 
30 1996(1) SACR 639 (A). 
31 Now known as the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
32 45 of 1988. 
33 45 of 1988. 
34 (1993) 2 ARB 2.2.1. 
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The question then arises as to whether the disciplinary procedure was fair or not. 
 
In an article in “Labour Law Briefs Vol 1 No 12” the author states that a disciplinary 
tribunal is not a court of law and is entitled to admit hearsay evidence at hearings.  
He states that although it is permissible there is a danger that hearsay evidence may 
be unreliable.  It must therefore be treated with caution.  Having admitted the 
evidence the tribunal must consider what weight, if any, should be given. 
 
If, for example, an employee was dismissed for theft, and the only evidence against 
him, is hearsay evidence of a witness who heard from an eyewitness that the 
employee had stole some goods from the workplace.  The eyewitness is not 
prepared to testify because of possible fear.  If the employee is also charged in a 
criminal court it is doubtful whether the presiding officer would allow the hearsay.35  If 
we look at section 3(1)(c) the Law of Evidence Amendment Act36 the nature of the 
proceedings (criminal trail), the nature of the evidence (single eyewitness with no 
other circumstantial evidence to corroborate), the purpose for which he evidence is 
tendered (to be a decisive answer to the guilt of the accused), probative value of the 
evidence (the non-witness cannot be cross-examined to see what he saw was 
correct and reliable), any prejudice to a party (the evidence will establish a crime and 
                                                                 
35 In Elandsrand Gold Mining Co Ltd v NUM (1998) 7 ARB 2.2.1 Arbitrator Adv Munnik ordered 
reinstatement.  He stated:  “The company’s case, as I have already stated, is not supported by 
any direct evidence whatsoever of the transgressions alleged to have been committed by Mr 
Silemala.  Mr Santos’s testimony regarding the evidence presented at the disciplinary inquiry is, 
in its entirety, pure hearsay and, in the context that it cannot, in the absence of the witnesses 
Ndlovu and Chivete, be questioned or challenged, is of no probative value to me whatsoever in 
my assessment of the true facts of the matter.” 
36 45 of 1988. 
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the accused will be convicted and dismissed) all counts against admissibility.  The 
only factor in favour of admissibility is the reason why the hearsay is tendered (the 
non-witness is afraid to testify because of possible intimidation or revenge).   When 
the same scenario is taken to arbitration, why must the employee be treated 
differently?   
 
Why must he lose his job after several years of service, only because the hearsay 
evidence was allowed?  The answer might be that we are not dealing with a court of 
law and in terms of section 138 (1) of the Labour Relations Act37 the arbitration 
proceedings are less formal.  It is submitted that section 138 does not mean that 
commissioners can apply a lower standard of adjective law when it comes to 
evidence and especially when dealing with the hearsay rule.   
 
Firstly, it must be stressed that presiding officers are expected to know their law and 
in particular the law of evidence.  A well-known author in the law of delict and law of 
succession had the following to say about the law.38  You must first be a trier of fact 
and only then after all be a trier of law to suit your facts.  You have to be good at both 
otherwise you suffer the embarrassment that all your mistakes will be highlighted on 
review.  
 
In the case of Scholtz v Maseko NO39 the arbitrator failed to inform the applicant of 
her right to legal representation.  Further the arbitrator’s failure to inform the applicant 
                                                                 
37 66 of 1995. 
38 Dr N J Van der Merwe inter alia co-author of Van der Merwe en Olivier Die Onregmatige Daad 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1989);  “the law is very grim, it is like a jealous mistress, it wants all 
its time and attention”. 
  12 
of the rules of evidence also constituted a reviewable gross irregularity.  What does it 
mean to say that arbitrations should be less technical and formalistic in their 
approach?  It cannot be stated that the meaning of section 138 of the Labour 
Relations Act implies that commissioners need not to be so strict on the law.40  It is 
submitted what section 138 actually implies is that rigid legal formalities must not 
apply.  Legal formalities mean strict custom in a court of law.  As far as arbitrations 
are concerned the approach will be different.  In other words it is not the way you do 
it as long as you do it.   
 
The arbitration process can therefore not be challenged if the arbitrator conducted 
the hearing in a relaxed and less formal manner.  As long as he applies his or her 
mind to the merits of the facts and give the parties the opportunities mentioned in 
section 138(2) of the Labour Relations Act.41  Section 138 can never implies that 
commissioners can ignore the law and or create their own law.  The law is the law 
and legal formalities are rules of custom or practice.42  Legal technicalities is different 
from legal formalities.  To be technical is to be strict in the application of rules or strict 
in the interpretation of words.43  Section 138 does not make mention of the word 
“technical”.  It is submitted that “technical” connotes intricate while “formalities” 
connotes simple custom or etiquette.  Accordingly, it is submitted that section 138 
only implies that the strict legal formalities should be done away with.  Section 3 of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
39 [2000] 9 BLLR 1111 (LC). 
40 66 of 1995. 
41 66 of 1995.  The opportunities to parties are to give evidence; call witnesses; question 
witnesses; and address concluding arguments. 
42 The following may be seen as examples:  What is the dress code at the hearing?;  How do you 
address the commissioner?;  Does the witness have to stand when he testifies?;  How does the 
cross-examiner address the witness?  See also MC LEOD The New Collins Dictionary and 
Thesaurus (1990) 394. 
43 See MC LEOD Collins Dictionary 1030 - 1031. 
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the Law of Evidence Amendment Act44 made the hearsay rule already less technical.  
It is not for arbitrators to make the law of evidence less technical and hereby create 
their own law. 
 
To give the parties their opportunities cognisance of the law is required.  How can the 
parties give evidence if the principles of evidence are ignored?  In the case of SA 
Cleaning Services Ltd v Steel Mining and Commercial Workers Union & Others the 
commissioner allowed the employee’s representative to testify on her behalf.45  The 
award was set aside on review.  Surely section 138 (2)46 permits the commissioner to 
use his discretion as to the format of the hearing.    
 
But a commissioner cannot hereby deviate from the standards of the law of evidence.  
The importance for arbitrators to know their law of evidence must be reiterated.  
Deviations from the principles of evidence will only lead to awards being set aside on 
review. 
 
The hearsay rule is part of the law of evidence and has to be adhered to. Presiding 
officers in labour proceedings must take cognizance of the fact that for a award to be 
justifiable case the applicant must have had a fair hearing.47  A fair hearing can only 
be conducted by way of evidence.  When hearsay evidence is to be considered it can 
only be admitted if it is “in the interest of justice”.   In Rainbow Farms (Pty) Ltd v 
                                                                 
44 45 of 1988. 
45 [2000] 9 BLLR 1106 (LC). 
46 S 138(2) of the LRA reads: “Subject to the discretion of the commissioner as to the appropriate 
form of the proceedings, a party to the dispute may give evidence, call witnesses, question the 
witnesses of any other party, and address concluding arguments to the commissioner”. 
47 See the test for review in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus No [1998] 19 ILJ 1425 (LAC). 
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FAWU48 arbitrator Pretorius rejected hearsay evidence on identification for there was 
no reliable corroboration of the hearsay evidence.  Pretorius stated  “Now the law in 
regard to hearsay evidence is quite clear:  if it is in the interests of justice then I 
should have regard to such evidence.  However even if such evidence is admitted it 
should be approached with a great deal of caution, because it is untested and 
therefore inherently unreliable.”  From the instant case it is clear that the arbitrator 
cannot make the law of evidence less technical and apply a lesser test.  The 
arbitrator has to apply the hearsay rule.  The employee will not have a fair hearing if 
he is to be dismissed on identification, which he could not contest, or cha llenge.  In 
the case of S v Dyimbane49 the court declared that “the Court must bear in mind all 
the factors set out in the section and take an overall view at the end thereof”.  In 
other words the court will make a finding on the admissibility of hearsay in the 
interest of justice, after all the factors (factors in favour and against) have been 
considered.  It is submitted that hearsay should not be more readily allowed merely 
because the nature of the proceedings is arbitration proceedings.   
 
The nature of the proceedings is but one factor to consider.  In Hlongwane v Rector, 
SA Francis College50 the court considered the factors in section 3(1)(c) of the Law of 
Evidence Ammendment Act.51  The applicants were matriculants suspended for 
political related reasons.  They made a motion application to lift their suspension.  
The rector in his supporting affidavit made use of hearsay evidence.  The reasons 
being that the sources of information were too scared to be identified because of fear 
for revenge.   The court found that the nature of the process and evidence, as well as 
                                                                 
48 (1996) 5 ARB 2.2.3. 
49 1990(2) SACR 502 (SE) 505. 
50 1989(3) SA 318 (N). 
51 45 of 1988. 
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the purpose thereof counted against admissibility.  The court also found that the 
probative value and reason for submittal of the evidence counted in favour of 
admissibility. 52   Finally under “any other factor”53 the court took into consideration the 
serious consequences for the school and scholars and the remaining teachers. 
 
Galgut J summarises his finding as follows:  “Weighing up all the relevant features 
referred to in section 3(1)(c) of the Act, I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion 
that in my opinion all of the hearsay evidence should be admitted in the interest of 
justice”.54  The court was initially reluctant to allow the hearsay when it considered the 
nature of the process.  The court reckoned that because it is motion proceedings the 
rector would not face cross-examination and his evidence could not be tested.  In the 
light of the instant case it is submitted that the nature of arbitration proceedings may 
on occasion count against the admissibility of hearsay evidence.  Instead of saying 
that hearsay will be more easily allowed during arbitration proceedings, the contrary 
seems also true.55   
 
Hence if an arbitrator allows other evidence more easily because of a less formal 
approach, the pressure is on him to look with more caution to hearsay evidence.56  
There’s no sole factor for the admissibility of hearsay evidence.  If the evidence is 
admitted or provisionally admitted it may be worthless because of another factor, for 
                                                                 
52 The probative value being that there are certain limited independent or undisputed facts which 
are not hearsay and which tend to show that what is contained in the hearsay evidence may 
well be true.  The reason being that the history of assault is indicative of possible revenge. 
53 S 3(1)(c)(vii) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
54 Hlongwane v Rector SA Francis College 327 A. 
55 Because the arbitrations are of less legal formalism, the temptation arises to create a carte 
blanche for the admission of hearsay evidence.  It is submitted that the need therefore arises to 
view hearsay evidence with more circumspection.  This will afford the parties a fear hearing.  
56 For instance where an arbitrator allowed documentary evidence not in accordance with the 
rules of evidence, he is faced with an even bigger problem when he has to look at corroboration 
of or the reliability of the hearsay evidence in order to admit it. 
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example the probative value.57  The facts of each case will influence the approach to 
evidence and to hearsay evidence.58 
 
With reference to subsection (v) of section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act59 the court in Secunda Supermarket CC t/a Secunda Spar & another 
v Dreyer NO decided that hearsay evidence was not acceptable in the absence of 
clear or cogent reasons why direct evidence cannot be presented.60  In Checkers SA 
(Ltd) v SACCAWU61 the Company led evidence that the test shopper was no longer 
employed by the company and was unwilling to testify.  An adverse inference for the 
witness failure to testify could not be drawn.  In the instant case arbitrator De Villiers 
held:  “I do not believe the union’s case was materially prejudiced simply because it 
could not cross-examine the test shopper.  Not only was what the test shopper said 
corroborated, in all material aspects ... but there is sufficient circumstantial evidence 
for me to find, on a balance of probabilities, that what the test shopper said happened 
had happened.” 
 
In Mnyama v Gxalaba  Conradie J stated: “Section 3(1)(c) empowers the Court to 
admit hearsay evidence in the interests of justice.  In deciding what is in the interests 
of justice the Court may have regard, not only to certain specified matters, such as 
the purpose for which the evidence is tendered and its probative value, but to any 
                                                                 
57 See Mnyama v Gxalaba supra 653 F-I. 
58 See the DB Thermal case infra.  (The contents of the disciplinary record was in dispute and it 
was never formally handed in as evidence.); see also the Naraindath case supra.  (The contents 
of the disciplinary record was never in dispute.  The employee never contested the witnesses’ 
versions during the disciplinary hearing.  The employee also had a different version during 
arbitration). 
59 45 of 1988. 
60 1998 10 BLLR 1062 (LC). 
61 (1991) 1 ARB 2.2.7. 
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other factor which in the opinion of the Court should be take into account”.62 
 
In Metedad v National Employers’ General Insurance63 Van Schalkwyk J stated:  “It 
means only that evidence tendered for a compelling reason would stand a better 
chance of admission than evidence tendered for a doubtful or illegitimate purpose.”  
 
“This section [3(1)(c)] invest in the court with a discretion, to be judicially exercised in 
the interests of justice.  It seems to me that the purpose of the amendment was to 
permit hearsay evidence in certain circumstances where the application of rigid and 
somewhat archaic principles might frustrate the interests of justice.  The exclusion of 
the hearsay statement of an otherwise reliable person whose testimony cannot be 
obtained might be a far greater injustice than any uncertainty, which may result from 
its admission.  Moreover, the fact that the statement is untested by cross-examination 
is a factor to be taken into account in assessing its probative value.”64 
 
In S v Cekiso65 Zietsman J stated:  “The effect of this section of the Act is that 
hearsay evidence will not be admitted without agreement between the parties unless 
the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such evidence depends 
himself testifies.  In other words, the opportunity of properly testing the evidence 
must still be present.  Section 3(1)(c) provides an exception to this requirement. 
 
In terms of that subsection the Court has a discretion to admit hearsay evidence 
even though the probative value of such evidence cannot be tested in the normal 
                                                                 
62 Mnyama v Gxalaba 652 I. 
63 1992(1) SA 494 (W) 498 E. 
64 Metedad v National Employers’ General Insuarnce 498H - 499A. 
65 1990 (4) SA 20 (E) 21C-E. 
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way.  In my opinion this section should not be lightly applied.  The section provides 
specifically that any prejudice which might be caused to a party if the evidence is 
admitted is one of the factors to be considered.” 
 
“In my opinion the discretion given to the Court by s 3(1)(c) of Act 45 of 1988 should 
not be exercised in favour of allowing hearsay evidence on controversial issues upon 
which conflicting evidence has already been given.  To do so could result in severe 
prejudice to the person against whom the evidence is given, and it would not be in 
the interests of justice to allow such evidence which cannot be tested in the normal 
way.” 66  
 
Our current labour case law includes arbitration awards and Labour Court judgments 
reported.  Our court decisions on hearsay are ultimately the example to follow.  It is 
apparent that the rigid application of hearsay evidence has now given way to a 
versatile application.  The courts have now discretion as to the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence.  Arbitrators have to look at the courts for guidance. 
 
The mere fact that arbitration proceedings are less formalistic does not mean that 
arbitrators can open the floodgates for hearsay evidence.  The courts tell us to 
handle hearsay with caution and to admit it in the interest of justice when compelling 
circumstance requires it.  Justice must be done.  For arbitrators to reach decisions on 
the basis of fairness and equity in an open and democratic society, it does not mean 
personal considerations of fairness.  Justice must be done, based on decisions of 
objective considerations of fairness in line with our law on hearsay evidence.  We 
                                                                 
66 S v Cekiso 22 A - B. 
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must be careful not to make a fallacy of the word “fairness”.   
 
Our decisions on the admissibility of hearsay must be calculated on objective 
fairness according to sound application of the rules of law.  If a decision is done in 
this manner and one of the parties has to forfeit, justice is done.  Fairness in this 
sense does not mean that both parties should be satisfied and that a compromise 
should be reach.  Accordingly arbitrators should realize the important task upon them 
and school themselves in labour law to make proper decisions.  The only manner in 
which their decisions will be scrutinised is on review, which needs some thought. 
 
7. DOCUMENTARY HEARSAY EVIDENCE 
 
It is worthwhile to make mention of documentary hearsay evidence, a subject 
frequently dealt with by arbitrators.  In this day and time arbitrators will be faced more 
and more with this kind of evidence.  Therefore an overview thereof is necessary.  
 
Documentary evidence is evidence in the form of a document.   For admissibility 
under the common law of such evidence certain requirements have to be met 
whereby certain issues are taken into account, for instance: 
 
1. originality of the document; 
2. proof of authenticity; 
3. nature of the document; 
4. all other relevant issues.67 
                                                                 
67 See Hoffman & Zeffert Law of Evidence 389 - 404; see Schmidt Bewysreg 315 - 337. 
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It is apparent that the test for admissibility of documentary evidence is more stringent 
than the test for real evidence. 
 
Real evidence consists of things or objects submitted as evidence for the court to 
observe.  Under the common law a party who wants to make use of real evidence 
only has to indicate its relevance, submit it and supplement it with other evidence to 
prove its relevance.68 
 
As far as civil proceedings is concerned section 33 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence 
Act is applicable and describes a document.69  The definition of “document” in section 
33 reads “includes any book, map, plan, drawing or photograph”.  This is apart from 
the ordinary meaning of a document and if the context otherwise indicates in section 
33.  Section 222 of the Criminal Procedure Act 70 made section 33 mutatis mutandis 
applicable to criminal proceedings.  In criminal proceedings section 221 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act71 is applicable. 
 
Before the enactment of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act,72 there were one 
common law and few statutory exceptions applicable to documentary hearsay 
evidence.  The common law exceptions are public documents.73  A public document 
proves itself.  That is the reason why it is an exception.  Private documents have to 
                                                                 
68 Hoffman & Zeffert Law of Evidence 404 - 405. 
69 25 of 1965. 
70 51 of 1977; s 222 reads “The provisions of sections 33 to 38 inclusive, of the Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act, 1965 (Act 25 of 1965), shall mutatis mutandis apply with reference to criminal 
proceedings.” 
71 51 of 1977; s 221 declares that a document includes “any device by means of which information 
is recorded or stored.” 
72 45 of 1988. 
73 See Hoffman & Zeffert Law of Evidence 397; Schmidt Bewysreg 333, 461. 
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adhere to the hearsay rule.74  The statutory exceptions relevant here are Part VI of 
the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act75 (section 222 of the Criminal Procedure Act76) 
and section 221 of the Criminal Procedure Act77 already mentioned.  Part VI of the 
Civil Proceedings Evidence Act78 came as an important relaxation of the hearsay rule.  
It is therefore important to note a few aspects.79  Section 221 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act80 is an important exception as far as certain trade and business record 
are concerned.  Du Toit81 et al give a general discussions of section 221. 
 
Hearsay evidence is now dealt with in terms of section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act.82  The same applies for documentary hearsay evidence.  The 
statutory exceptions will remain intact.  Du Toit et al83 states “but it is clear that future 
reliance on these exceptions will be infrequent in light of the liberal approach 
engendered by s 3(1)(c)”.  “It is submitted that they constitute alternative routes to 
admissibility in that, if an item of evidence fails  - albeit narrowly - to satisfy the 
conditions of the statutory exception, the courts are still at liberty to consider its 
admissibility under s 3(1).” 
 
It is submitted that there is a vast difference between common law positions and the 
current position.  Reliable hearsay was excluded.  Hoffman & Zeffert84 had the 
following to say about the common law hearsay rule.  “This rule is calculated to 
                                                                 
74 Schmidt Bewysreg 333 n 1. 
75 25 of 1965. 
76 51 of 1977. 
77 51 of 1977. 
78 25 of 1965. 
79 See Schmidt Bewysreg 462 - 470. 
80 51 of 1977. 
81 Du Toit, De Jager, Paizes, Skeen & Van der Merwe Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 
24 - 83. 
82 45 of 1988. 
83 Du Toit et al Commentary of the Criminal Procedure Act 24 - 83. 
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cause good deal of judicial frustration.  As Lord Reid observed in Myers v DPP:  ‘the 
law regarding hearsay evidence is technical, and I want to say absurdly technical’.” 
The position has changed.  The new approach to hearsay evidence is less technical 
and easier to grasp.  The new hearsay rule makes provision of any kind of hearsay 
evidence made by a person other than a person upon whose credibility the probative 
value of such evidence depends. 
 
Documentary hearsay evidence is one form of hearsay evidence.  The nature of the 
evidence will determine what form of evidence you deal with.  
 
Video evidence, for instance, can either be documentary hearsay evidence or real 
evidence as were decided by case law.85  
 
It is submitted that it is really not that crucial, to identify the form of hearsay evidence 
under the new hearsay rule.  It is but one factor for the court to consider.  What is 
important is to meet the requirements of section 3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act.86  The common law rules can be of guidance to a court.  The 
hearsay rule is now more relaxed.  It is for this reason and not for the nature of the 
proceedings that hearsay evidence is more easily admitted.  The approach submitted 
by Schmidt87 must be approved.  He submitted that uncertainties or defects in 
evidence should rather affect probative value than admissibility.  Arbitrators will have 
to make a value judgment after all factors, are considered, even if the hearsay 
evidence was easily admitted. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
84 Hoffman & Zeffert Law of Evidence 625. 
85 See Hoffman & Zeffert Law of Evidence 407 - 412; Schmidt Bewysreg 345 - 346. 
86 45 of 1988. 
87 Schmidt Bewysreg 344 - 346. 
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In NUMSA v Baldwin Steel88 the important part of the employers evidence was based 
on a video recording.  The employee was dismissed for misconduct.  The important 
question for the commissioner to decide was whether the video tape as hearsay 
evidence should be admitted.  Commissioner Vermaak, it is submitted took the 
correct approach.  He considered various factors and finally decided on the probative 
value of the hearsay evidence.  He stated “I ruled that the video tape and transcript 
be admitted as evidence with the proviso that the weight afforded to this evidence be 
determined in light of all the other evidence lead by the parties”.  Commissioner 
Vermaak gave due regard to the following  factors: 
 
1. that Mr Breda, the witness could not be traced and sufficient effort was made to 
trace him; 
 
2. the authenticity of the video was not attacked by the employee; 
 
3. Mr Warren is experienced in video recording, testified and made the video 
recording himself; 
 
4. the video tape lend further weight to Mr Breda’s written statement; 
 
5. the relevance of the evidence; 
 
6. the nature of the proceedings; 
                                                                 
88 (1999) 8 CCMA 2.2.1. 
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7. stock losses indicated was not challenged; 
 
8, numerous contradiction by the employee; 
 
9. employee was an unsatisfactory witness; 
 
10. statement on video was corroborated though not materially; 
 
11. employee is guilty without relying on the video. 
 
This case is indicative of the fact that the commissioner was cautious about the 
hearsay evidence.  He looked for circumstantial evidence and corroboration.  Though 
he admitted the hearsay evidence, shortcomings affected the weight attached to the 
evidence. 
 
8. REVIEW OF AWARDS 
 
It is useful to look at review of awards because the incorrect application of and 
approach to the hearsay rule can form part of a ground of review and may influence a 
reviewing judge’s decision. 
 
Arbitrations under the Arbitration Act89 are reviewed in terms of section 33(1) of the 
said Act.   
                                                                 
89 42 of 1965. 
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The test on review is whether the arbitrator was biased, corrupt or committed a gross 
irregularity.  A narrower test applies than in other arbitrations.  An interesting 
judgment on the said Act is Eskom v Hiemstra NO.90  Judgment was given by 
Landman  J who stated  “ An error in law however, when used in the context of 
private arbitration, is something of a misnomer for, save in a few instances, none of 
which are relevant here, the arbitrator is the judge of the law for purposes of the 
arbitration and a fortiori the arbitrator cannot be wrong.  Similarly, if the arbitrator 
made a leap in logic, the parties have selected him as their judge and cannot 
complain about his process of reasoning save in those instances such as mala fides, 
which is not alleged here”.91   
 
Landman J further declared: 
 
“An arbitration conducted on a voluntary basis in terms of the Arbitration Act of 1965 
need not, and is usually not, conducted by an organ of state.  In this case the parties’ 
arbitrator is a private citizen and not an organ of state.  Section 33 and the test of 
justifiability is not applicable to this situation.  Policy considerations do not enter into 
picture for our law has always recognised that by choosing one’s forum one may be 
choosing a different standard of justice”.92 
 
Only if a arbitrator’s decision was biased or based on corruption or to admit hearsay 
evidence that for instance amounts to a gross irregularity will the Labour Court 
intervene on review.  This means that the arbitrator did not apply his mind to the facts 
maybe because of bias and not in the interest of justice to allow the hearsay 
evidence, avoiding the applicant a fair hearing as mention in section 34 of the 
                                                                 
90 [1999] 10 BLLR 1041 (LC). 
91 Eskom v Hiemstra 1047 D - E. 
92 Eskom v Heimstra 1045 H - I.  
  26 
Constitution.93  Section 34 reads as follows:   
 
“Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of 
law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another 
independent and impartial tribunal or forum”. 
 
Judge Landman stated that section 34 remains applicable in private arbitrations.  
However a mere error of law or fact will not constitute gross irregularity only material 
irregularities will suffice. 
 
Reviews in terms of section 145 of The Labour Relations Act will be dealt with 
differently and with more scrutiny according to the Eskom case94 and the Carephone 
case.95  Commissioners are organs of state therefore section 33 of the Constitution 
and the justifiability test do apply.96  This was confirmed in Glaxo Welcome SA(Pty) 
Ltd v Mashaba.97   
 
The criticism however in Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe,98 is seen to 
be obiter.99   The importance of evidence and its kind as well as the admissability 
                                                                 
93 108 of 1996. 
94 Supra. 
95 Supra;  Read the case of Reunert Industries (Pty) Ltd t/a Reutech Defence Industries v Naiker 
and Others (1997) 18 ILJ 1393 (LC).  The Court found that a gross irregularity had been 
committed, as the commissioner did not allow the parties address on the issue of penalty.  The 
Court did however made the comment that misconduct under section 145 of the LRA might be 
more widely construed as its counterpart under the Arbitration Act.  The Court raised the 
importance of every citizen’s constitutional right to a decision in line with the law 1396 G “Where 
they are summonsed to appear before an administrative body exercising judicial powers they 
may expect that the tribunal will know and apply the law correctly ”. 
96  The test means whether or not a decision is justifiable in terms of s 33 of the Constitution of 
1996.  Section 33 deals with the responsibility of public bodies as far as administration is 
concerned.   It was decided in the Carephone case supra that the CCMA is a public body which 
have to adhere to the requirements of s 33. 
97 [2000] 8 BLLR 923 (LC) 924 I - 926 E. 
98 [2000] 3 BLLR 243 (LAC). 
99 The criticism was based on the fact that s 145 of Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 sets clear 
grounds for review and that justifiability is not a separate ground of review; See Toyota South 
Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe 254 E - G. 
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thereof is well illustrated in DB Thermal (Pty) Ltd v CCMA.100  In the instant case 
grounds for review were based on gross irregularity.   
 
Gamble J gave judgment and stated “In terms of section 136 and 138 of the Labour 
Relations Act, an arbitrator is obliged to determine the dispute before him 
expeditiously and with the minimum of legal formalities.  The latter section is, 
however, not a carte blanche to an arbitrator to ignore the rules of evidence”.101  It 
appears from the facts that the commissioner based his award solely on the record of 
the disciplinary hearing, which was not admitted as evidence.  The judge decided 
that there was no material properly placed before the arbitrator.  The arbitrator had a 
duty to point out to the parties how evidence should be produced.  This constitutes 
gross irregularities, which renders the award reviewable.  It is submitted that the 
arbitrator should have admitted the disciplinary record as hearsay evidence with the 
consent of both parties.  Otherwise the disciplinary record could have been admitted 
as documentary evidence.  The truth of the contents can be proved if both parties 
consent to the fact that the contents are true.  If not, the party who wants to submit it 
must call witnesses to proof the contents thereof.  If for argument’s sake substantive 
fairness of a dismissal is in dispute (misconduct is denied), it would be futile to submit 
the disciplinary record.  Rather call the witnesses in the form of viva voce evidence to 
proof that the employee committed misconduct. 
 
In Naraindath case the Labour Court took the approach that the disciplinary record 
was hearsay evidence.102  The court decided that under the circumstances the 
hearsay evidence was correctly admitted as evidence.  The ratio being that section 
                                                                 
100 [2000] 10 BLLR 1163 (LC). 
101 DB Thermal (Pty) Ltd v CCMA 1167 E. 
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138(1) of The Labour Relations Act 103 promotes a process “with the minimum of legal 
formalities”.  Given the circumstances the reliance on hearsay was to his satisfaction 
on proper grounds.  In this instant case a lot of emphasis was placed on the nature of 
the proceeding to approve the admissibility of the hearsay.  
 
Wallis AJ went into detail as to what the legislature’s intention was with section 138 
of The Labour Relations Act.104  The draft bill was discussed to substantiate his 
reasoning.  The sole question, it is submitted, to be asked is whether or not the 
commissioner committed on reviewable irregularity or misconduct which prevented a 
fair hearing.  When an incorrect application of the hearsay rule is alleged to form part 
of gross irregularity, the sole question will be whether or not the presiding officer 
conducted the proceedings in a fair manner and gave the applicant a fair hearing.  
The question is not whether or not the arbitrator conducted the process in a different 
way.  This is precisely the inference I gather for the view of Wallis AJ: 
 
“In my view it is perfectly clear in these circumstances that a complaint that a 
commissioner has conducted proceedings in a way which differs from the way 
in which the same dispute would be dealt with before a court of law cannot as 
such succeed.  It is only where the person seeking to challenge the 
commissioner’s award can point to specific unfairness arising from that action 
by the commissioner that a proper ground for review is established.  A failure to 
conduct arbitration proceedings in a fair manner, where that has the effect that 
one of the parties does not receive a fair hearing of their case, will almost 
inevitably mean either that the commissioner has committed misconduct in 
relation to his or her duties as an arbitrator or that the commissioner has 
committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings”.105 
 
Accordingly it is submitted that it doesn’t matter what process an arbitrator follows as 
long as he applies the law of evidence.  In other words an arbitrator can never be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
102 Supra n 23. 
103 66 of 1995. 
104 66 of 1995. 
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obliged to conduct proceedings in a strict manner as long as the proceedings was 
conducted in a fair manner.   
 
The Court referred to the role of the arbitrator in proceedings: “I also agree with the 
warning which Jali AJ (as he then was) sounded in Mutual & Federal Insurance 
Company Ltd v CCMA & others [1997] 12 BLLR 1610 (LC) about the need for an 
arbitrator, who adopts a more inquisitorial and participative role in the proceedings 
than is customarily the case in an adversarial hearing, to be vigilant to ensure not 
only that the proceedings are fair to both parties but that the appearance of fairness 
is always maintained.  However, with respect, insofar as certain passages in his 
judgment might be taken to indicate that it is only a traditional adversarial process as 
we know it from our courts that conforms to the well established rules of natural 
justice so that the commissioner’s role is to mimic that of a trial judge and be a ‘silent 
umpire’ I, with respect, cannot agree with him.”106  The need is there to concur and 
disagrees with both Jali AJ and Wallis AJ.  Not to say that a strict adversarial role is 
required from arbitrators.  What is submitted that it is a good guideline for arbitrators 
to follow.  The rules of natural justice of the English Common Law, which have to be 
applied in arbitrations 107 are indicative of the adversarial system.  Wiechers108 has the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
105 Naraindath case 725 A - C of the judgment. 
106 Naraindath case 726 B - E. 
107 Brandt, Lötter, Mischke & Steadman Labour Dispute Resolution (1997) 183 “It is widely 
accepted that the procedure for the adjudication of disputes is based on the ‘rules of natural 
justice’.  These principles are usually expressed in the form of two Latin maxims:  audi alteram 
partem (‘hear the other side’) and nemo iudex in propria causa (‘no one may judge his own 
cause’) (see Baxter Administrative Law at 536).  The Industrial Court applied these rules and so 
will any arbitrator.  This is understandable because, as Baxter points out (at 538), the principles 
of natural justice serve three purposes: 
- they facilitate accurate and informed decision-making 
- they ensure that decisions are made in the public interest and 
- they cater for (certain) important process values. 
 The Industrial Court (per fabricius) AM in Twala v ABC Shoe Store (1987) 8 ILJ 714 rules that 
those involved in industrial relations should have strict regard to the rules of natural justice.   
This applies to disciplinary hearings, private arbitration and statutory arbitration”. 
108  Administrative Law (1985) 208. 
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following to say about the rule of natural justice: 
 
“The rules of natural justice are common-law rules which are applicable to 
administrative enquiries and hearings.  The objection may immediately be raised that 
these rules are far more than mere rules of procedure and that they really ensure that a 
kind of fundamental or primeval justice materializes.  It can immediately be conceded 
that these rules are, by their very nature, much more than a formal code of 
administrative conduct.  As will become apparent from the discussion of the nature of 
the rules of natural justice, the application of the rules does indeed ensure simple 
justice between legal subjects.  And yet it is the ideal objective of all legal rules to 
ensure that justice is done.”  
 
The adversarial system is in line with the rules of natural justice.  There is a very 
good reason for that.  Firstly audi alteram partem109 requires that the other party be 
given an opportunity to state his case.110  Silent umpires are intellectuals and 
therefore good listeners.   Secondly nemo iudex in propia causa requires the 
presiding officer to be impartial and non-biased.111  Why the adversarial approach?  
Judges generally listen with dedication, question with confidence and judge without 
emotion.  The biggest trap of the inquisitorial approach is that you become involved 
in the case.  The more you form part of the commotion the less you see the wood 
from the trees.  Where do you draw the line?  Coming from a legal background the 
adversarial approach is favoured.  A strict adversarial approach is not suggested.  
What is required from this approach is to remain professional, objective and 
uninvolved.  If you need to ascertain the facts inquisitorially from the parties, do it 
within certain parameters.  Facts in labour law proceedings or court proceedings can 
only be proved by way of evidence and nothing else.  The DB Thermal case112 and 
Pick ‘n Pay Stores case113 as conformation.  Cape Town City Council v SAMWU.114 
Prove the importance of the law of evidence, and the manner of its proof. 
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110  Wiechers Administrative Law 210 - 215 
111  No one may judge his own cause. 
112  Supra. 
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Emphasis is not on the nature of proceedings, but on the “manner of its proof”.  
Commissioners or arbitrators who think that they can conduct a case without 
evidence at all, are grossly mistaken.  It is a bizarre world filled with ridicule.  Brand 115 
cited the case of BAWU & Others v Edward Hotel116 where De Kock AM remarked as 
follows:  “It is not appropriate to lay down rules for how ... facts are to be placed 
before the court but that need not necessarily be done by way of evidence.  How it 
can best be done should be determined by the circumstances ...  The court has wide 
powers of enquiry.  The court will in each case have to determine, whether and how 
the facts are to be verified or amplified by evidence, viva voce or by affidavit”.  This is 
incorrect.  How on earth can there be evidence of facts without evidence.  The same 
“bizarre” situation played off in DB Thermal case.117  In the instant case the Court 
decided that evidence of entrapment is permissible in employment context provided 
that entrapment must be conducted fairly and in accordance with the requirements of 
section 252A of the Criminal Procedure Act.118  In other words to avoid grounds for 
review, arbitrators must be alert as to “the manner of its proof”.  A more perfect 
example than this case cannot be found to explain my whole argument.  It doesn’t 
matter how informal and less technical you want to make the proceedings, you 
cannot get away from the rules of evidence including the hearsay rule, unless you 
exclude some of them by agreement.  You cannot exclude all, because if you don’t 
have evidence at all on what basis are you going to make your judgment! 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
113  Supra. 
114  [2000] 11 BLLR 1239 (LC). 
115  Brandt et al Labour Dispute Resolutions 183. 
116  [1989] 10 ILJ 537 376 D-F. 
117  Supra 1165 - 1166 of the judgment. 
118  51 of 1977. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
Every game has its rules.  The same applies to the game of labour law proceedings.  
Surely private arbitration agreements can exclude some rules of evidence.  Be it as it 
may the law of evidence cannot totally be ignored no matter what legal process. The 
hearsay rule is part of the law of evidence and arbitrator have to take cognisance 
thereof. 
 
The manner in which arbitration proceedings are dealt with depends on the terms of 
reference. Private arbitrations are ruled by arbitration agreements.  Statutory 
arbitrations are dealt with in terms of the Labour Relations Act.119  Although section 
138(1) of the Labour Relations Act120 allows commissioners a discretion as to the 
manner of the process with the minimum of legal formalities, the commissioner must 
still deal with the “substantial merits”.121  This discretion, it is submitted, is qualified by 
section 138(2) of the Labour Relations Act.122  A party to the process or dispute may 
give evidence, call witnesses, question the witnesses and address concluding 
arguments.  Hereby the importance of the law of evidence is mentioned.  To call, to 
question and to give evidence is nothing other than the law of evidence.  Therefore 
the importance of the law of evidence and in particular our topic the hearsay rule 
cannot be over emphasised. 
 
Some of the labour law cases cited may create the inference that the hearsay rule 
can be watered down in arbitration proceedings because of section 138 of the Labour 
                                                                 
119  66 of 1995. 
120  Supra. 
121  This means the merits of the case, which can only be facta probanda (facts in dispute) and facta 
probantia (the proving facts) - see also 3 supra of the dispute.   
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Relations Act.123  It was argued that not too much emphasis must be placed on the 
nature of the proceedings in this regard.  Section 138 of the Labour Relations Act124 
does not say it either.  The only implied inference comes form section 3(1)(c)(i) of the 
Law of Evidence Amendment Act125 where the nature of the proceedings is taken into 
account.  It was argued that the nature of proceedings is but one factor for the 
presiding officer to consider.  There are several other factors too.  The presiding 
officer has to apply his mind to the facts (consider the substantial merits).  Further he 
has to look at all the factor in section 3(1) before he makes final judgement.  The true 
test in section 3(1) is whether or not the hearsay evidence should be admitted in the 
interest of justice.  The new hearsay rule is relaxed and less technical.  Arbitrators 
need not relax it even further.126 
 
The incorrect application of the hearsay rule can sometimes lead to reviewable 
grounds of an award.  Section 33 of the Arbitration Act127 set out the clear grounds 
for review as far as private arbitrations is concerned.  It is not necessary to repeat the 
grounds or the discussion thereof.  It is important to note that a narrower test for 
review applies during private arbitrations than in the case of arbitrations under the 
Labour Relations Act.128  An error in law in the last mentioned case can amount to 
misconduct in terms of section 145 of the Labour Relations Act.129  To incorrectly 
construe the hearsay rule can amount to reviewable misconduct by the arbitrator.  
Yet again arbitrators knowledge of the law of evidence is of paramount importance.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
122  Supra. 
123  Supra. 
124  Supra. 
125  45 of 1988. 
126  Iudicis est ius dicere non dare (it is the province of a judge to expound or interpret the law not to 
make it). 
127  42 of 1965. 
128  66 of 1995. 
129  Supra. 
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As for arbitrations in terms of the Labour Relations Act, section 145 sets out clear 
grounds for review.   What is more of importance and what have been discussed are 
“misconduct or gross irregularity” as a grounds for review.  For an arbitrator to 
commit a gross irregularity as far as the hearsay rule is concerned, it must be shown 
that his decision to admit hearsay was not justifiable under the circumstances in the 
sense that the applicant did not have a fair hearing.  Consequently gross irregularity 
lies in the fact that the arbitrator prevented the applicant a fair hearing under the 
circumstances.  Only then will the hearsay rule form part of  “gross irregularity” as a 
ground of review.  A mere error of fact or law would not necessarily lead to a ground 
of review, unless the arbitrator misconduct himself or committed a gross irregularity.  
Misconduct can sometimes also amount to gross irregularity.  In other words the 
arbitrator misconduct himself and by doing that also committed a gross irregularity.  
 
Finally the importance of arbitrators to know their law and understand the basics of 
the law of evidence as a whole must be emphasised.  Once conversant with 
instances like the hearsay rule, arbitrators can be far better triers of fact and the law. 
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